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GENOCIDE IN THE SHADOW OF DEMOCRACY
The Psycho-Politics of Modern Mass Murder
Johannes Lang
I denne artikel håber jeg at vise, at storpolitik (læs: folkemord) 
er yderst menneskelig og derfor også psykologisk. Psykologi 
har definitivt meget at tilføre både historieforskning og den 
politiske videnskab, siden historie er politik og politik ER psy-
kologi. Psykologer må ikke være bange for de store processer. 
Når man blot fokuserer på det individuelle i vor globaliserede 
verden, risikerer man at trivialisere sig selv og sine argumenter 
i den samfundsmæssige debat. Hvis psykologien vil noget mere 
end at lindre privat lidelse inden for klinikkens lyddæmpede 
vægge, må den få øjnene op ikke kun for det sociale i men-
nesket, men også for det menneskelige i det sociale og det 
socialpsykologiske i samfundets systemer. Denne artikel er et 
eksempel på denne indgangsvinkel. Jeg udforsker den psyko-
politiske sammenhæng mellem demokrati og folkemord, både 
gennem at skitsere de historiske og systemiske forbindelser og 
ved at undersøge den farlige interaktion mellem voldsregimer 
og deres demokratiske modparter. Det er klart, at folkemord 
er enorme historiske og politiske processer, men dette betyder 
ikke, at de ikke også er højst psykologiske begivenheder.
»In democracies, men are placed in office through popular elec-
tions. Yet, once installed, they are no less in authority than those 
who get there by other means.«
      – Stanley Milgram1
»We must leave it to yourself to decide [whether] the end pro-
posed should be their extermination, or their removal...The same 
world would scarcely do for them and us.«
       – Thomas Jefferson2
On July 31, 1932, the Nazis won the national elections in Germany and 
prepared to assume power. Thirteen years later, large parts of the world lay 
in rubble and millions of innocent people had died. Approximately six mil-
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lion Jews had perished in the gas chambers and the countryside of Eastern 
Europe. A nightmare unlike any other had befallen the heartland of Europe; 
until then, the core of high civilisation. The question »How could this hap-
pen?« soon became a cliché in the works of Western intellectuals; »Never 
again!« even more so on the lips of the survivors. And yet the question 
remained topical, as the determined outcry proved itself void of any real 
political substance.
 Genocides have persisted after World War II, and every occurrence is 
popularly explained in terms of pre-modern backlashes, such as tribalism, 
ancient hatreds, and failed democracy. But these interpretations miss the 
point entirely, and for good reason. Indeed, if we were to fully acknowledge 
the roots of modern genocide, it would cast an incriminating shadow on the 
development and conduct of our very own civilisation, and some of the mo-
ments in history that we have learnt to praise would take on a more sinister 
quality. July 31, 1932 in Germany provides a clue to this puzzle, but the truth 
is more disturbing, as the preconditions for the Nazis and the Holocaust did 
not actually originate in feudal Germany but in progressive France (Wokler, 
2000). As Jürgen Habermas contends, Nazism may have been a consequence 
of Germany’s failure to follow Britain and France in maintaining the fragile 
balance between universalistic and particularistic elements of national iden-
tity (cf. Fleming, 2003, p. 99). But the theoretical and political developments 
necessary to modern genocide were nonetheless liberal revolutionary inven-
tions; that is, the ideas of nation-state, democracy, and the rights of man. 
All these things were (at least partly) realised in 1776 and 1789, and the 
prerequisites for modern genocide slipped into existence with them.
 In this article, I will start by considering this darker tendency, and show 
how modern ethnic cleansing and genocide3 result from the same ideologi-
cal foundations that democracy, and indeed modernity itself, rest upon. The 
first section of the article will thus be concerned with the structural links 
between democracy and modern genocide: the birth of the nation-state, its 
democratic ideals, and their impact on subsequent episodes of ethnic vio-
lence. Seen through the lens of modern genocide, it becomes terribly clear 
that the process that led to the nation-state and its democracy was as much 
a definition of the Other as it was a creation of »We the People.« For an 
»us« to exist, there must naturally be a »them.« Earlier in history, the fun-
damental dividing lines had followed class denominations. Now democracy 
challenged these divisions and created new ones, between citizen and non-
citizen. Combining with the dawn of racism and the technological bloom of 
modern society, the road to total genocide was being paved.
3   Ethnic cleansing is here understood as the removal – through murder or deportation 
– of an ethnic group from a geographical area, whereas genocide is the intentional 
attempt to destroy a whole group, as that group is defined by the perpetrators. The 
former term is, of course, a euphemism, borrowed from the genocidaires them-
selves.
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 But democracy as a system is not only linked to modern genocide through 
the same historical processes, and democracies do not only indirectly con-
tribute to mass murder. There are also direct causal relationships between 
democratic and genocidal regimes, as powerful democracies destabilise 
states and whole regions that eventually resort to genocide. Furthermore, 
when genocides are either imminent or unfolding in these regions, Western 
democracies almost always fail to prevent or halt them. 
 Virtually unhindered, the perpetrators are then free to act out their evil 
intentions. Towards the end of the article, I will briefly describe the psychol-
ogy of these genocidal killers, as they proceed with their societal project. 
How does the individual become a killer within this larger framework? 
Which social forces induce him to comply, and what psychological proc-
esses transform him into a perpetrator?
 For now, let’s begin by examining the interrelated phenomena of moder-
nity, nation-state, democracy, and genocide – and explore how democracy 
and modern genocide are not mutually exclusive phenomena, as we would 
like to believe, but instead historically linked processes.
1. Some Structural Links between Democracy and Mass Murder
Democracy is usually portrayed in immensely positive ways. It is the most 
fundamental Western value, upon which our whole modern civilisation 
rests. It is described as good, progressive, and intrinsically hostile to au-
thoritarianism or any kind of fundamentalism. Post 9/11, it has taken on an 
almost spiritual dimension – to counter the terrorists’ totalitarian worldview 
– as the summit of human civilisation and the natural enemy of Evil. 
 There is, of course, much truth to this vision, however simplistic and 
glorified its presentation may be. The brighter sides of democracy are well 
known. It is true that humanity has never before enjoyed a more inclusive, 
accountable, and universalistic political system. In principle, everyone is 
equal before the law and protected from arbitrary state violence; everyone 
has the right to liberty and opportunity – in principle. The real picture is far 
more sombre and complex. For democracy casts a distinctly less favourable 
shadow back through the last few centuries; a shadow that covers exclusion, 
ethnic cleansing, and ultimately genocide.
1.1 The Symbiosis between Democracy and Nationalism: Imagining the 
»People«
Before the French and American revolutions, empires and kingdoms usu-
ally consisted of various linguistic communities. Their borders were vague 
delineations on the outskirts of the central powers’ spheres of influence, 
and class – rather than nationality – prevailed as the main form of social 
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categorisation. It was impossible to imagine a coherent national community 
because there could be no such unity (Anderson, 1991). 
 The French Revolution was a reaction to this ideology of legitimate class 
hierarchy. It relaxed the social constraints of the class system, and imposed 
the liberal ideals of equality before the law, the rights of man, and the rule 
of the people. In the political vacuum that followed the decapitation of the 
monarch, these new definitions of the social world required a fundamental 
reorganisation of society. If the »People« were to rule and enjoy equality 
before the law, it became essential to establish whom the »People« actually 
were and what was to be ruled. 
The »citizen« and »nation-state« became the practical responses to these 
requirements of the democratising process, suggesting that the new political 
system might in fact be inseparable from nationalism (Nodia, 1994). The 
nation-state was defined as the territorial and cultural unit of the nation, 
and the citizen was the individual who fell under this territorial and cultural 
definition. However, this was not simply a matter of distinguishing already 
existent cultural entities. The establishment of territorial borders was an arti-
ficial ordering from above, as the modern state reduced and simplified com-
plex phenomena in order to control and manipulate them centrally. Since the 
conceptions of democracy and the nation-state would only be coherent if an 
actual nation could be perceived, the modern nation-states – intent on long-
term sustainability and stability in the international economy – launched 
campaigns of assimilation. This was novel in history, as the new elites were 
the first rulers to require that their subjects actually identify with their rule 
(Levene, 2005). In the eyes of the nationalist, the national community thus 
has an egalitarian nature, since we are all fundamentally the same (Wimmer, 
2002). The national revolution is a social and societal project, aimed at mak-
ing everyone equal. Perpetrators of genocide are revolutionary in this sense, 
as they transgress all moral boundaries in their pursuit of such sameness 
– an equality that will supposedly entail societal bliss.
This strain of social engineering would have been inconceivable in earlier 
times, when the order of things was pre-ordained by God. Modernity’s intel-
lectual endeavour, on the other hand, was free of such limitations. It took 
place in an increasingly secular world. As the power of the Church rapidly 
declined in Europe, a new, »scientific« way of viewing the world came 
to dominate, and with it, an optimistic belief in progress – indeed infinite 
progress. The disciples of the new Age set out to categorise, understand, and 
improve the world. As the anthropologist of genocide, Alexander Hinton 
(2002), writes:
This optimistic bubble of ideas contributed greatly to the emergence 
of the key metanarrative of modernity – the teleological myth of »pro-
gress« and »civilization.« On the one hand, the human condition was 
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portrayed as involving the inexorable march of progress from a state of 
savagery to one of civilization. On the other hand, reason and science 
provided the means to facilitate this march through social engineering; 
human societies, like nature, could be mastered, reconstructed, and 
improved (p. 8).
In this way, modernity did not only mean all power to the people; it also cre-
ated a sense of the all-powerful people. This is the backdrop against which 
the new ideals of nation and state developed. God was overthrown, and with 
him the natural order of things. It was now up to the People to discover the 
real order and then manipulate it.
1.2 The Danger of Exclusion within the Nation-State: Genocide as a 
Modern Result
Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turned, 1979) tells us that there is a strong 
human tendency to define ourselves into groups. This tendency goes hand in 
hand with other social sentiments, such as in-group favouritism, out-group 
stereotyping, and inter-group hostility. In light of this, the structural link 
between democracy and nationalism only becomes truly dangerous when 
the definition of »citizen« becomes narrow and exclusive.
Most nations have to deal with ethnic minorities. The history, ideology, and 
resources of the nation determine who gets excluded and what is to be done 
with them. If the state has limited resources, favouritism can be one way of 
distinguishing between beneficiaries and outsiders. When this favouritism 
follows ethnic dividing lines, ethnicity is politicised. At this point, there are 
three strategies available to the leaderships in multi-ethic societies. These 
are compromise-, gradualistic-, and radical solutions (Nodia, 1994). The 
first group of solutions could include power-sharing, where all the groups 
are welcomed into the decision-making process. The second strategy would 
entail assimilation, such as when members of an ethnic group are forced to 
relinquish their own cultural heritage and adopt the customs of the major-
ity. Finally, the radical solutions contain various forms of ethnic cleansing 
and genocide. Belgium is an example of the first strategy, while Australia’s 
treatment of the Aboriginals illustrates the second. In recent times, Rwanda 
is perhaps the most atrocious example of the radical solutions.
Democracies are certainly not immune to economic and ethnic iniqui-
ties. Indeed, democratic states are both exclusive and excluding – and often 
contradictory – in their treatment of resident individuals. For example, when 
the American soldiers landed in Europe towards the end of World War II, 
they were shocked by the intensity of anti-Semitism there, yet practised ra-
cial segregation at home in the US. Similarly, the French subscribed to the 
ideas of liberty and equality, while simultaneously establishing oppressive 
colonial regimes across the world (Todorov, 1996). This type of exclusion 
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– or »institutional closure« (Wimmer, 2002, p. 9) – usually occurs in nation-
states. It is political, legal, military, and social, and it shuts people out. As we 
have seen, it was democracy, rather than authoritarianism, that gave rise to 
this new world-order where the »citizen« became the unit of social organisa-
tion. And as fledgling democracies scrambled to define the »citizen,« they 
simultaneously created the non-citizen. Imagining the nation necessarily 
entailed imagining the Other. 
Herein lies the very seed of modern genocide. Earlier episodes of slaugh-
ter were usually linked to warfare and the desire to eliminate a territorial 
competitor or terrify a population into submission (Hinton, 2002). Later, 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, modernity claimed its 
victims primarily in the name of imperialism, as indigenous peoples on the 
outskirts of Civilisation were slaughtered before its advance. But after the 
liberal revolutions, the modern intellectual project joined forces with the 
rise of the nation-state, and the socio-cultural dimensions of this endeavour 
would turn the state’s destructive gaze inward to discover enemies within. 
Crucial distinctions were made between people, with class and race as the 
dominant denominations. 
The truly important thing is not where the dividing lines were drawn, 
but that they were drawn. In the Soviet Union they followed class delinea-
tions; in Nazi Germany, the categorisations were biologically derived. Even 
though many cases of actual genocide seem to be based on ethnic and racial 
conflicts, the underlying issue is actually the modern state’s emphasis on 
social coherence. The crucial development towards modern genocides thus 
took place when the targeted populations came to be seen as alien and in 
opposition to the state. Once a group is seen as such, it is exposed to the 
terrible force of the state, and it is mainly up to the national leadership how 
it wished to deal with its members (Levene, 2005).
Let me emphasise at this point that genocide is not a new phenomenon, 
nor is it necessarily modern. Rather, modern genocides are something more 
than their pre-modern ancestors, and it makes them into something else, 
psychologically different from the Roman destruction of Carthage, for ex-
ample. What is fundamentally new about modern genocide is its scale and 
intent, which is the total annihilation of a perceived cultural/ethnic group. 
The local tribes have been replaced by the nation-states, and the inhabitants 
of defeated cities or territories have been exchanged for the Armenian, the 
Jew, and the Tutsi. Mass murder is no longer only an instrument of war or 
a consequence of imperialism, but also the final goal of the perpetrators. 
Historically, this murderous potential took shape in the first half of the nine-
teenth century, as the definition of citizenship transformed from a strictly 
territorial definition to a linguistic and ethnic one. In a lethal turn of events, 
the national citizenship replaced the universal human rights of the Enlight-
Johannes Lang78
enment. The outbreak of World War I further entrenched this culturalisation 
and eventual racialisation of nationalist thought (Wimmer, 2002).4 
2. Democracies’ Role in the Genocidal Process: 
Critiquing a Political Power Structure that Allows Mass Murder
A range of factors has been identified as precursors to genocide. These 
include difficult life conditions (Staub, 1989), ethnic stratification within 
a pluralistic society (Kuper, 1981), a prevailing culture of cruelty (Waller, 
2002), political upheaval (Harff, 2003), state failure (Fein, 1999), and auto-
cratic government (Harff, 2004). But the role of these societal factors needs 
to be re-examined, especially in regards to their perceived causal centrality 
in the genocidal process. As fundamental and essential precursors, they 
seem too simplistic – effects rather than origins – and neither causally nec-
essary nor sufficient to the evolution of genocide.
The dangers inherent in nationalism have no doubt become terribly 
evident over the last couple of centuries. Simultaneously, the complicity of 
democracies in the genocidal processes around the world has been largely 
overlooked or trivialised. An obvious reason for this neglect owes to the 
central role played by authoritarian regimes in modern mass slaughter. Put 
simply, authoritarianism appears to be a precondition for genocide. But this 
view is superficial and only scratches the stormy surface of much deeper 
waters. Instead it is essential to realise that within the modern nation-state, 
the people actually relinquished the means of violence into the hands of the 
ruling elite (Bauman, 1989). This was true not only of totalitarian regimes, 
but was – and still is – fundamentally important to all democratic states as 
well. The modern state has a monopoly on violence.
As a consequence, the origin of recent genocides is partly to be found 
in the interplay between modernity and nationalism. Understood as a 
post-industrial, self-conscious political project (Vetlesen, 2000), modernity 
entailed powerful states aspiring towards constant improvement. This new 
worldview, with its emerging nationalism, exchanged a more Hobbesian 
model of society for an »international system« (Levene, 2004, p. 153), 
within which individual self-interest was replaced by national self-interest 
as the guiding principle for action.
4   Curiously, this racial thinking – originating with the multicultural experiences of 
colonial empires – was a contemporary version of the pre-modern class system and 
its belief in hereditary privilege (Anderson, 1991). Now, within the modern nation-
state, this primitive type of thinking was revitalised by modern science and fuelled by 
the Enlightenment’s obsession with categorisation and generalisation, as well as with 
its ideals of constant improvement and progress. Within the highly organised state, 
it would only be a matter of time before these racial distinctions were employed in 
pursuit of the new nationalistic ideals.
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Imperialism (and later, globalisation) then enabled this self-interest to 
extend beyond Western shores, allowing the increasingly industrialised 
nations’ violent means to be employed against foreign peoples. Empires 
were born through both a military and cultural onslaught. Democracies are 
no exception. The democratic United States nearly annihilated the Native 
Americans in a genocidal campaign that would not end until the massacre 
at Wounded Knee in 1890. Such honourable men as Thomas Jefferson and 
Theodore Roosevelt supported this extermination as a necessary and justi-
fiable solution, providing Adolf Hitler with the convenient argument that 
the Nazis were only following in the footsteps of the Americans (Mann, 
2005). Similarly, on their side of the Atlantic, the revolutionary French had 
previously massacred the Vendéens in the name of national unity. Instead of 
being a consequence of state failure, genocide results »from too much state 
power, from state-ism« (Stanton, 2004, p. 27).
Unfortunately, the state rarely perceives itself as a moral agent in inter-
national affairs (Staub, 2004), and bases most of its decisions on economic 
evaluations (Kuper, 1985). As a result, powerful nations regularly cause 
regional destabilisation while the perpetrators hide behind the veneer of 
»democracy.« For these reasons, it is also accurate to describe genocide as 
a synthesis between regional destabilisation and the industrialised powers’ 
self-interest. As Todorov (1996, p. 168) wrote, »Auschwitz becomes pos-
sible when national interest is held above that of humanity.« And since re-
gional destabilisation is frequently a goal of modern, Western states – while 
self-interest fuels their passivity in the face of mass killing, it is clear that 
the image of most modern democracies as innocent bystanders to genocide 
is untenable. Simultaneously, it becomes evident that terms like »evil« and 
»genocide« often serve as linguistic weapons in the arsenal of the politically 
empowered; only applicable beyond Western civilization and the clutches of 
self-incrimination.
2.1 The UN’s Continued Failure to Intervene in Genocides 
In the years since the outcry »Never again!«, at least fifty-five genocides and 
politicides have occurred around the world (Stanton, 2004). Until recently, 
people were dying en masse in Sudan, as the result of what the US Secre-
tary of State, Colin Powell, called »genocide« in his testimony before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September, 2004 (Slavin, 2004). At 
that time, the Sudanese government – using its air force, Arab militias, and 
organised starvation – was systematically killing the black population of the 
Darfur region. In conservative numbers, this meant that at least 30.000 in-
dividuals had been killed so far, and that 1.5 million people were on the run 
from the violence. The US administration consequently decided to call the 
situation in Sudan genocide, and went on to accuse four Security Council 
members (China, Russia, Algeria, and Pakistan) of valuing business with 
Sudan over humanitarian concerns (Oliver, 2004).
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Under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, the signatory states (including the US) are required to 
deploy an armed force in order to bring an immediate halt to the alleged 
genocide. But just like previous administrations had done, the United States 
government shied away from an unfolding, distant catastrophe that could 
potentially become another black hole of American deaths. However, Sudan 
did receive increased attention from the world community. Two months 
after Powell labelled the atrocities genocide, UN Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan, urged the Security Council to issue a warning. As a result of this 
international pressure, a fragile peace agreement has now come in place, 
and on June 6, 2005, the International Criminal Court proclaimed that it will 
investigate government officials in Sudan in relation to the brutal events that 
occurred in Darfur (Vasagar, 2005).
I recount this (temporary?) »success story« of the new millennium be-
cause it is a promising one: the perpetrating government responded positive-
ly to diplomatic pressure, and a possible genocide was stopped. This shows 
that – contrary to prevalent misconceptions – genocide can be efficiently 
halted, also without enormous military losses.
But sadly, this »success story« represents little more than the exception 
to the rule; a curious anecdote in the history of failed genocide prevention. 
Considering the actual track record of the international community’s deter-
mination to forcefully prevent genocide, a more sinister question certainly 
lingers in the background: for what would have happened if the Sudanese 
government had given no heed to the international warnings, and instead 
intensified its genocidal campaign? Would the UN have intervened? Would 
it have sent troops to engage the regime in combat? Would the US have done 
so? Maybe. But unfortunately, based on previous experience, the answer is 
probably not.
The international community has a bleak record indeed when it comes to 
restraining or preventing genocide through forceful military action (Kuper, 
1985). Again and again, the world – with the US government and the UN 
in the lead – has been an inactive witness to human slaughter. In Turkey, in 
Nazi-occupied Europe, in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, the world did 
little or nothing to stop, or even condemn, the annihilation of innocent civil-
ians (Power, 2002). The reasons behind this inaction are related to politics 
– with its ideologies, diplomatic intrigues, and opinion polls – and to the 
present organisational systems, with their economical limitations and politi-
cally retrained power structures.
There is often a wide gap between popular views and political attitudes 
in regards to the prevention of genocide. Sixty-five percent of Americans 
(polled in 1994) believed that the United Nations should always, or in most 
cases, intervene with the necessary force in order to stop acts of genocide, 
whereas eighty percent would favour intervention in Bosnia and Rwanda, if 
the UN determined that genocide was being perpetrated there. The prospect 
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of some American deaths did not deter this determination (Fein, 1999, p. 
62).
It is a long way from this idealistic stand to the reality of international 
politics. For in truth, human suffering rarely mobilises policy makers (Harff, 
2003), who are more concerned about economics, domestic popularity, and 
the lives of their own citizens than with the thousands of victims in a far-
away region of the world (Fein, 1999). The leader of the UN Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, put it this way: »[w]e 
actually expected around 50,000 plus dead. Can you imagine having that ex-
pectation in Europe? Racism slips in so it changes our expectations« (Pow-
er, 2002, p. 350). Ignorance, self-interest, prejudice, remoteness, and even 
racism interact in the creation of a fundamental indifference in the Western 
governments. On top of this, there is a natural fear of making mistakes. The 
democratic leaders are afraid of their electorate: how will they be judged? 
Will certain »humanitarian« decisions destroy any chances of re-election? 
Here we see it very clearly, how democratic mechanisms contribute to geno-
cide. The majority opinion in the population – real or imagined – guides the 
government in its moral choices.
But such an initial sense of indifference is only the beginning of the 
problems presently surrounding genocide prevention. Aggravating the situ-
ation is the fact that the only organisation with a formal mandate to prevent 
genocide today is the UN: a hotchpotch of national interests and diplomatic 
tug-of-wars. Some of the UN’s fundamental shortcomings are related to 
its insufficient funds. Indeed, the UN’s total budget is only fifteen billion 
dollars per year, amounting to less than two percent of the world’s annual 
investment of eight hundred billion dollars in its military (Øberg, 2004). As 
a result, UN departments lack the adequate resources necessary in order to 
implement long-term anti-genocide strategies. What is more, the Depart-
ment of Political Affairs (which is supposed to deal with mass murder 
scenarios) even lacks personnel who are experts in genocide prevention 
(Stanton, 2004).
Insufficient funds aside, the UN is structurally organised in a way that 
gives free reign to the political motives and diplomatic struggles mentioned 
in the preceding paragraphs. This flaw permeates the whole system, all the 
way into the heart of the decision making process: the Security Council. 
Just consider the fact that the five permanent members on the Council 
(the United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia) control as much as 
eighty-six percent of the global weapons trade (Øberg, 2004). There can be 
no neutrality under such conditions.
What is more, each of these members has the power to veto any proposed 
course of action. This, of course, means that countries such as China or Rus-
sia must agree with the Western powers before anything is decided. Not an 
impossible situation, but not a very productive one either, especially in re-
gards to international intervention. This was clearly seen in the case of Cam-
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bodia, when Britain wanted to launch an investigation into the situation, 
and Russia, Yugoslavia, and Syria responded by blocking any such action 
(Power, 2002). The result of this dynamic was not only a lack of forceful 
intervention: indeed, after three full years of mass slaughter in Cambodia, 
the UN had not even issued an official condemnation of the regime!
Finally, it can be costly to oppose the system and fight for change. The 
inventor of the term »genocide,« Raphael Lemkin, died of a heart attack 
after having struggled for decades to get the Genocide Convention ratified. 
Isolated by the establishment, only seven people attended the funeral of this 
exceptional man. Other people who spoke out and demanded action risked 
their careers. For instance, when the appropriately named Archer Blood, US 
consul general in Dacca, stated that genocide was taking place in eastern 
Pakistan in the early 1970s and expressed dissent in regards to the American 
inaction towards the Pakistani assault on the Bengalis, he was recalled from 
his post.
Later, in relation to the slaughter of the Hutu in Burundi, a State Depart-
ment official responded to a junior official’s appeal for action by asking, 
»Do you know of any official whose career has been advanced because he 
spoke out for human rights?« (Power, 2002, p. 83). Since the decision mak-
ers are also simultaneously the highest »employers« of the organisation, any 
insubordinate grass root initiatives can be eliminated, thus maintaining a 
status quo that has proven thoroughly inefficient at preventing genocide.
Thus paralysed, the danger inherent in the UN’s responsibility is exactly 
its inability to fulfil this mandate; for at present, the UN is both ideologi-
cally and systemically restrained from the kind of action and flexibility that 
is necessary in order to efficiently prevent genocides.
2.2 Ideological Restraint: The Principle of State Sovereignty
The UN’s fight against genocide was ideologically restrained from the very 
beginning. Keep in mind, for instance, that political mass murder was kept 
out of the formal definition of genocide because of Soviet pressure (prob-
lematic, since all mass murder is »political« in some sense). And when it 
comes to the crucial matter of prevention itself, this enjoys only two per-
functory remarks in the Convention (Kuper, 1985).
The UN is mainly dedicated to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, based on protecting the territorial integrity, political independ-
ence, and national sovereignty of its member states. This traditionally pro-
vided order, stability, and predictability in international relations. But today, 
as most armed conflicts are internal rather than international, and almost all 
genocides are domestic, genocide seems to be beyond UN jurisdiction, as 
that organisation was initially conceived. It is therefore legitimate to ques-
tion whether the human costs of the international stability have become 
too high, and subsequently whether the prevailing political belief system is 
indeed morally defensible.
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If the UN is to extricate itself from this quagmire of lethal bystanding, 
the organisation has to face its modern challenge of reconciling outdated 
founding principles with the present geopolitical situation. But this reform-
ist objective faces numerous political obstacles. Significantly, the influential 
economic-oriented thinking stands in the way. This is then coupled with the 
fact that states usually distinguish between national and international inter-
ests (where the former hold precedence). When an intervention is neither 
economically profitable nor in the interest of the nation (as that is narrowly 
defined), preventive intervention will typically be deemed impractical.
Furthermore, the UN consists of numerous states that worry about future 
accusations of genocide being directed against themselves (e.g., China in 
Tibet and Russia in Chechnya), as well as states that maintain important 
trading connections with the present perpetrators (cf. Powell’s accusation, 
mentioned earlier). Both of these groups will have little interest in any form 
of intervention; they will argue against it, and veto any military operation 
when given the chance.
In the frequent attempts to side-step their preventive obligation inherent in 
any declaration of genocide, hesitant or disinterested member states will of-
ten choose to obscure the problem by framing the situation in less dramatic 
language, characterising genocides as »humanitarian crises« or »civil wars« 
(Fein, 1999, p. 42). This kind of »strategic denial« (Lemarchand, 2003, p. 
144) was dramatically displayed by US policies during the Rwandan and 
Bosnian genocides, when any mention of the so-called »g-word« (Power, 
2002, p. 358) was systematically erased from the official descriptions of the 
slaughter. Such linguistic manoeuvres muddle the perception of the causal 
relationships and obfuscate the identities of the perpetrators. The result is 
that the crime goes unacknowledged, and consequently that no intervention 
is legally required.
2.3 The Danger of Empty Threats
A double standard resides within the UN. This is evident in the way the del-
egates agree on abstract moral standards, but refuse to outline any concrete 
measures for implementation of those standards on the ground. In this way, 
a plethora of declarations and conventions emanate from the organisation, 
lacking any practical substance. A moral precedent is set, but not enforced.
On the other hand, this double standard is also evident in many of the in-
terventions that are made. Obviously, the involved states often have ulterior 
motives for interfering in the other state’s internal affairs (the inconsistent 
justifications made by the American and British leaderships in order to 
invade Iraq come to mind). But when the line is not clearly drawn between 
genuine humanitarian interventions and politically motivated military cam-
paigns, the latter can significantly hinder the former. This was certainly 
true in relation to the Cambodian experience in the seventies. In that case, 
the Americans had just suffered a terrible defeat in Vietnam, and as the 
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US-backed regime of Lon Nol fell to the Khmer Rouge (KR), the Ameri-
can political establishment never seriously considered implicating itself in 
another Southeast Asian campaign. What is more, in the wake of Watergate 
and the Vietnam disaster, the Nixon and Ford administrations had lost all 
credibility. Since they were also intricately linked to the fallen Cambodian 
regime, Ford’s citations of intelligence reports, arguing that a bloodbath was 
unfolding under the KR, seemed to the American public and the political 
opposition to be nothing more than a new strategy in the fight against Com-
munism (Power, 2002). 
This illustrates one of the terrible dangers of political credibility-loss. 
Within democracies, credibility becomes a crucial element of power. If 
you have it, you can do almost anything; without it, you are finished as 
a leader. For all practical purposes, the preceding ideological conflict (in 
Vietnam) stood in the way of a morally and humanly important interven-
tion (in Cambodia). As this fact combined with the US’s failure to ratify the 
Genocide Convention – and with the exclusion of political groups in that 
document – the decision was all but predetermined: that is, to abandon the 
Cambodian people to its own fate behind the closed borders of »Democratic 
Kampuchea.« Within the next three years, approximately two million peo-
ple would be killed.
The double standard inevitably creates an »impression of hypocrisy« 
(Kuper, 1985, p. 89) in the international community, and it certainly rep-
resents a grave disservice to the project of genocide prevention. A very 
harmful consequence of this inconsistency in intervention policy has been 
characterised as »negative spillover effects« (Kuperman, 2003, p. 72), 
where the Western rhetoric appears to be believed by the oppressed groups 
and simultaneously discounted by the aggressors. In other words, previous 
military interventions have created an illusory humanitarian precedent. This 
gives false hope to suppressed minority groups and causes them to rise up 
where they would otherwise have remained silent, while signalling indi-
rectly to the elites that they may launch a genocidal campaign without suf-
fering international repercussions (Harff, 2003). In this way, empty threats 
from the international community may provoke the opposite effects of those 
intended and ultimately incite internal hostilities.
A dynamic similar to this was observed in the Balkan conflict. While 
the West proclaimed that it stood behind an independent Bosnia, Milosevic 
was well-briefed, and knew that this commitment was more rhetorical than 
militarily real (Power, 2002). Tragically, the declarations of the international 
community were once again believed – this time by the Bosnian Muslims, 
as they fled to the »safe area« of Srebrenica, where the UN guaranteed pro-
tection against the Serb perpetrators. But when the pressure was on and the 
Serb forces attacked Srebrenica, the organisation folded and the promised 
protection evaporated. No air support was granted and the few UN soldiers 
on the ground put down their weapons in order to avoid a fight in which they 
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would be significantly outnumbered. Instead of saving the Muslims, the UN 
had in effect created a concentration centre on behalf of the Serbs. Over the 
next few days, the worst massacre in Europe sine World War II took place 
in and around Srebrenica, claiming the lives of at least 7.000 Muslim men 
and boys.
3. Free to Act: A Brief Outline of the Psychology of Genocide
The reasons why a state resorts to genocide are many and vary from case 
to case, depending on historical contexts. One important reason would be 
that the perpetrators believe the targeted group(s) to be an obstacle to their 
vision of a better society. Inherent in this belief is a sense that the present 
situation is untenable, or at least highly undesirable. The Nazis told the eco-
nomically ruined Germans that the Jews were their misfortune, barring the 
way to a strong and proud Germany. In Rwanda, the killers were told that 
the Tutsi would forever plot the downfall of the Hutu, thus threatening the 
nation from within. This is exactly the kind of paranoid sentiment that drives 
the genocidal process towards its extreme solution. Finally, this ideological 
fanaticism, together with pragmatic political decisions, bring the architects 
of genocide to a point where the »logical« next step is mass murder. Indi-
vidual members of the targeted group may seem innocent and benign, but 
that is only on the surface. They are by their very nature dangerous and 
unalterable, and if they are not somehow removed from our midst, they will 
one day undermine us or totally destroy us. The killers therefore murder in 
order to save their civilisation from downfall. Or they kill in order to realise 
some imagined potential that can only flourish when the enemy within has 
been uprooted. As Himmler said, »It is the curse of greatness that it must 
step over dead bodies to create new life« (Mann, 2005, p. ix). The hellish 
scenes in Auschwitz are thus perceived to be necessary as steps on the way 
to the utopian Third Reich.
As they unfold, genocides typically follow a fairly stable pattern of 
increasing discrimination and violence towards the out-group(s), begin-
ning with stigmatisation and symbolisation, before progressing through 
dehumanisation, isolation, and annihilation (cf. Stanton, 1998). Through 
stigmatisation, the victimised group is defined as an unalterable category of 
beings. Their qualities are then described in very negative symbolic terms: 
the Jews were »infectious,« »vermin« and »lice,« whereas the Tutsi were 
»cockroaches« and »traitors.« Massive propaganda campaigns expound the 
targeted group’s harmful nature; it is a »problem« that needs to be solved.
The first solution is to remove them from society. The Nazis placed the 
Jews in ghettos and concentration camps, and the Khmer Rouge also had 
terrible prisons and work camps. The Soviet Union contained a veritable 
country of camps, with around 100.000.000 people passing through them 
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during their existence. If the ideologues are extreme enough, the final step 
is to kill all these unwanted »elements.«
The development towards genocide entails numerous psychological 
processes. Initially, it is hard to kill another human being. Members of the 
German killing squads in the East, for example, often vomited, cried, or 
ran away from their first massacres (Browning, 1992). Even the infamous 
Himmler and his subordinate, Adolf Eichmann, felt nauseous and uneasy, 
as they stood face-to-face with atrocity. Far from being a fulfilment of some 
animalistic instinct in us, mass murder takes the form of a cognitive conver-
sion process in most perpetrators. The personality-oriented models (e.g., 
Adorno et al., 1950; Lifton, 1986) have failed to explain this process in a 
satisfactory manner, and genocidal behaviour is thus presently understood 
in terms of social human tendencies. 
Recent explanations focus on the behavioural tendencies – towards 
compliance (Freedman and Fraser, 1966), conformity (Asch, 1951), and 
obedience (Milgram, 1974) – as well as on the social cognitive tendencies 
conductive to genocide, such as cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), 
diffusion of responsibility (Darley and Latane, 1968), dehumanisation 
(Bandura et al., 1975), just-word thinking (Lerner, 1980), in-group bias 
(Tajfel, 1981), deindividuation (Zimbardo, 2004), and ultimately moral 
disengagement (Bandura, 1999). Together – or apart – these psychological 
processes enable the individual to change his mental framework to such a 
degree that mass murder seems not only justifiable, but also morally good 
or even required.
Socio-political elites manipulate these psychological tendencies in order 
to achieve their exterminatory objectives. For genocide is not the natural end 
product of a specific historical process (as argued by Goldhagen, 1996). It 
is instead a psycho-political process, heavily dependent upon the regime’s 
success at placing the victims beyond the moral reach of the perpetrators. 
The lack of interference by other nations aids this psychological process by 
allowing it to unfold, unquestioned, unhindered, and unpunished. Despite 
all their humanistic aspirations, democracies have thus become accomplices 
in the horrors of genocide.
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